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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------------------------------------
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
SALVADOR P. TOSCANO, SR., 
:!Jefendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 67678 
--------------------------------------------------------------
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action before the Utah Supreme Court to 
review a decision of the Second Judicial District Court of 
Weber County, State of Utah, which held that Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments of $2,921.00, given 
to tho Appellant by the Respondent, were the result of 
factual error since the payments would not have been made 
had the Respondent known that the Appellant in fact owned a 
home and real property in Texas; and which entered judgment 
against the Appellant in accordance with Rule 54(c) (1) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure·. Appellant contends that 
he properly received the AFDC and that the State of Utah 
does not have the right to collect it back. ~ppellant was 
legally entitled to AFDC from the State of Utah under Responden 
own regulations, Volume II Section 410 .1, and to deny Appellant 
that legal entitlement is a violation of Appellant's due pro~s 
and equal protection rights under the Utah Constitution and 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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DISPOSITION BY 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
The Defendant was ordered to pay back assistance he 
received from the State of Utah in the amount of $2,921.00. 
Case No. 67678 in the Second Judicial District Court of 
Weber County. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the decision by the Second 
Judicial District Court of Weber County and, in addition, an 
award of retroactive benefits due. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Salvador P. Toscano, Sr., is a migrant farm-
worker from Muleshoe, Texas. In June of 1975 Appellant 
brought his wife and eight of his eleven children to work 
in the onion fields of Davis County, Utah. Subsequently, 
Appellant suffered a torn medial meniscus of the left knee 
during his employment and was unable to pursue further work 
in the onion fields or any other substantially gainful 
employment. Appellant was later in serious financial 
difficulty and went to the Assistance Payments Administration 
Office in Davis County to apply for aid. An interview was 
held between Appellant and an Assistance Payments Administration 
non-Spanish speaking representative concerning Appellant's 
eligibility for AFDC benefits. At this interview it was 
not asked whether Appellant owned a home. Appellant was 
given financial assistance which subsequently totaled 
$2,921.00. 
-2-
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On June 15, 1977, Appellant was sued by the State of 
Utah to collect the $2,921.00. The Complaint stated that 
Appellant had received the financial assistance by fradulentl~ 
misrepresenting to Plaintiff that he did not have a home 
in which he was not residing. 
Appellant filed an Answer with the Second District 
Court challenging the allegations made by the State of Utah. 
On September 27, 1979, and October 1, 1979, Appellant appeared 
with counsel at hearings before the Honorable Judge Calvin 
Gould. At those proceedings Appellant, through an interpreter 
stated that he could not understand the Engli~h language, much 
less read or write in English. Throughout the hearings an 
interpreter translated for the court and counsel, communica-
ting with Appellant and his family in Spanish. Appellant 
stated that he was a migrant farmworker and that he stayed 
in the State of Utah for the year of 1975 because of the 
injury he sustained, but that in 1976 and the years that 
followed, he migrated back and forth from Texas to Utah, and 
to other states as well. When questioned by counsel for the 
State, Appellant stated that he did not understand most of the I 
questions asked by the Assistance Payments representative; 
he was certain, however, that he was not asked whether he 
owned a home in Muleshoe, Texas. Appellant stated that he 
did not misrepresent any issue to the Assistance Payments 
Administration and that he did not know about the rules and 
regulations with regard to financial assistance. 
On October 1, 1979, Judge Calvin Gould rendered his 
decision holding that the failure of Appellant to report the 
-3-
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ownership of his home in Texas was not the result of fraud 
or misrepresentation by Appellant. The court found that 
Appellant's primary language was Spansih and that his ability 
to communicate in and understand English was severely limited; 
that Appellant's failure to report ownership of the home and 
real property in Texas was the result of lack of communication; 
that Appellant's home in -Texas was not an exempt asset or 
resource under Assistance Payments regulations; that Appellant's 
ownership of the same made him totally ineligible for the 
financial assistance he received;and that Respondent was 
entitled to judgment against Appellant in accordance with 
Rule 54(c) (1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the basis of 
factual error in the payment of monies, by Respondent, to 
Appellant in the amount of $2,921.00. This appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court followed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS, AT THE TIME IN QUESTION, ELIGIBLE FOR 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE BECAUSE HIS HOME IS 
EXEMPT UNDER VOLUME II SECTION 410.l OF THE UTAH 
RULES. 
Section 410.l of Volume II states: 
§ 410.1 Exempt Assets 
1. One home and lot owned or being purchased and 
occupied by the applicant or recipient, including 
a mobile home. 
a. If the home is owned or being purchased, 
the lot on which the home stands shall 
not exceed the average size of residential 
lots for the community in which it is 
located. The amount of property exceeding 
an average-size lot shall not be considered 
exemot oroperty. 
-4-
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b. When an individual owns but does not occupy 
a mobile home, the equity value of the mobile 
home shall not be considered exempt personal 
property. 
It is important to note that for financial assistance 
a home and lot must be occupied by the applicant before it i 
exempt. There has never been any question as to Appellant's 
occupying his home in Muleshoe, Texas. Appellant is a 
migrant farmworker and uses his home in Texas as a home base 
when he travels all over the Southwest and Northwest to do 
agricultural work. µe is required to travel great distances 
from his home base in Texas, however, he does leave his home 
occupied. Appellant owns only one home and pays taxes on it 
Because he and his family return to their home periodically 
during the year, he does not rent his home and does not 
collect any income from it. In December, 1975, when Appella 
applied for financial assistance and during the months 
Appellant received the financial assistance, Appellant 
occupied the home and lot .in Muleshoe, Texas, although he 
was not temporarily there. It is pointed out that Volume II 
does not define the term occupied, but it is submitted that 
the general dictionary definition is applicable and Appellan 
did "occupy"· the home. 
The case of Independent Fire Insurance Company v. 
Butler, 362 So. 2d 980 (1978), held that "occupancy" 
was largely a matter of intent and that a home did not need 
a continuous bodily presence of individuals in order 
to be occupied. Furthermore, the case of Independent 
5-
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Fire Insurance Company defined the term "occupied" to mean 
a dwelling in actual use by human beings who lived therein 
as their place of habitation. In the case of National Security 
Fire and Casualty Company v. Richard Lee James, 358 So. 2d 
737 (1978), the court stated that "unoccupied" means without 
occupants or animate objects; a dwelling is unoccupied when 
it is ceased to be used as a place of abode or residence by 
people. The Appellant in the case at bar legally "occupied" 
his home in Texas under the elements set out in aforementioned 
cases. 
The Appellant is a migrant Earmworker and at all times 
intended his home to be located in Muleshoe, Texas,and although 
there was not a continuous bodily presence of Appellant in 
his home, his home was and continues to be occupied by his 
children and Appellant; and at all times Appellant's home in 
Muleshoe, ~exas, has been used as the Appellant's place of 
abode and residence. 
In the case of Macomber v. State Social Welfare Board, 
346 P.2d 808 (1968), the court held that under statutes 
providing that real property owned but not occupied by a 
state old age security recipient shall be utilized to provide 
for the recipient's needs, regulations which required the 
recipient to sell a lot next to her home were void in that 
"utilize" did not include a sale; the recipient was entitled 
to retain real property even though it was not feasible to 
utilize it for her needs, and her transfer of that property 
to charity, with retention of life estate, did not render 
her ineligible to receive payments. In the case at bar, the 
-6-
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court should take a liberal approach in determining whether 
Appellant in fact "occupied" his home in Muleshoe, Texas, 
and find as the court did in Macomber. 
The Utah law regulating public financial assistance 
was enacted for the purpose of promoting the general welfare 
of all individuals. Appellant was working in the fields 
of Ut~h doing agricultu~ai wdrk when he was injured. 
This injury subsequently forced him to seek financial assistanc 
At all times he "occupied" his home in Muleshoe, Texas, and 
this court should find~accordingly. ~lthough the line of 
demarkation is incapable of precise definition, the courts 
have given general welfare laws a liberal construction with 
a view toward accomplishing its highly beneficent objectives. 
United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948). Brazons ~ivar 
Conservation & Reclamation Dist. v. Castello, 135 Tex.307, 
14 3 s . w. 2d 5 77 ( 19 4 0 ) . 
It is important to note that for food stamp assistance 
purposes the Appellant's home was exempted and he was able 
to receive public assistance. Basically, public financial 
assistance and food stamp assistance are the same, both are 
governed by federal and state regulations together, which 
may often be integrated and cross-applied. Where general finanl 
assistance regulations do not adequately define the situation 
1
1 
at hand, the food stamp assistance regulations may provide 
guidance that is equally applicable to financial assistance, 
since the two different forms of assistance and their 
governing regulations are so much alike. 
-7-
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Food stamp assistance is governed by Volume IV of the 
state regulations, and the applicable Sections in this case 
are 304.21 and 680.3 (presently 680.5). They state: 
§304.21 (Exempt Resources) Home and Lot. 
The home and lot normal to the community. 
§680.3 Verification of Migrant Resources: 
Special care sh9uld be taken in dealing with 
migrants to qetermine if there are out-of-
State resources or income from real property 
in the home-base area. For example, a Migrant 
who claims Texas as a home-base area and who 
is applying for food stamps in Utah, should be 
questioned as to the availability of resources 
in Texas as well as Utah. 
Particular attention should be paid to real 
property in the home-base area. Each applicant 
household is permitted one home and lot as an 
exemption from resources. If the applicant has 
a home and lot in Texas and does not own a 
residence in Utah, the Texas home will be 
exempted as a resource .... 
As noted, Volume IV of the food stamp regulations provide 
specific rules for migrant workers. As transients, migrant 
farmworkers can readily apply for food stamp assistance, and 
the policy of the welfare laws and regulations is to expedite 
their receiving this type of public assistance benefit. 
Hence, special sections are promulgated in Volume IV which 
apply only to migrants. The intent of the Volume IV 
regulations is to allow migrants the right to own a home 
in another state and consider it an exempt resource. 
Appellant was legally entitled to receive food stamps under 
the Utah rules because his home was considered an exempt 
resource; the same should hold true for the financial 
assistance that Appellant received. 
-8-
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For both food stamp assistance and financial assistance 
the home and lot belonging to Appellant was exempt; for 
financial assistance purposes the home and lot were occupied 
by the applicant as required under the Utah rules. Since 
the financial assistance rule does not specifically treat 
the situation of a migrant, but the goal of both rules is 
the same, therefore, the example of a.migrant who owns a 
home in Texas and works in Utah (Volume IV §680.3) provides 
applicable guidance in defining the meaning of "occupied" in 
this situation, for purposes of financial assistance as 
well. 7.':.l though Volume II does not have any special regulatio 
covering migrants, migrant status is relevant in determining 
financial assistance. Whether an applicant was a migrant is 
therefore an issue. As a migrant farmworker, Mr. Toscano was 
eligible for the financial assistance that he received. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAD TO 
REPORT OWNERSHIP OF HIS HOME IN TEXAS, DID 
NOT WILLFULLY WITHHOLD THE INFORMATION, AND SHOULD 
NOT BE HELD LIABLE THEREFOR. 
Appellant did not understand the questions concerning his 
resources because of his limited ability to communicate in 
the English language. The District II-A office of the 
Assistance Payments Administration was not staffed with 
personnel who spoke fluent Spanish, and one of ~ts staff 
did assist Appellant in filling out his application for 
assistance. Appellant did not understand the questions he 
was being asked by Respondent's representative at the time he 
applied for benefits. The Appellant did not withhold infor-
mation material to his eligibility; and the Appellant received! 
-9- j 
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financial assistance because of a lack of communications 
as found by the lower court. The case of Jacobo Garcia v. 
Califano, No. 77-422(D.N.J. 1977), should therefore apply. 
That case involved a Spanish-speaking individual who received 
Social Security Disability benefits and an attempt by the 
government to recover an overpayment. Whether the recipient 
of an overpayment of Soc{al Security Disability benefits was 
at fault and could be required to repay the extra funds depended 
upon whether he knew or should have known ·that he was receiving 
an overpayment. With~n a period of several weeks, the 
recipient had accepted two checks, each for $3,138, one of 
which constituted an overpayment. Although the overpayment and 
the recipient's entitlement in general had been explained 
in letters sent to him by the Social Security Administration, 
he was unable to read them because he was literate only in 
Spanish. The court held that the government could not 
recover an overpayment of disability benefits from any 
recipient who was found without fault in regard thereto. 
The record in the case at bar shows that Appellant was 
without fault in regard to overpayment of benefits, and he 
should not be required to pay back those payments he received 
from the Assistance Payments Administration. 
On a further note, it is against the public interest to 
congest the courts with trivial, perhaps meaningless, and 
even counterproductive lawsuits like the one presented by 
Respondent in this case. 
The attempts to collect the $2,921.00 overpayment from 
Appellant have continued for almost three years, at considerable 
-10-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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expense to the public. The Court should rule in Appellant's 
favor if for no other reason than to provide an example for 
those with authority to decline collection of future over-
payments in similar circumstances. At least a future waste of! 
public money could be avoided. 
Not only is it highly questionable whether collection 
efforts recover enough overpayments to ~ay for the administra-
tion and legal costs involved in such activity, it is all the 
more questionable whether blameless households are a desirable 
target of collection proceedings. In proceeding against those 
households, the State is treating those innocent of any 
wrongdoing exactly the same as the outright welfare chisler. 
This indiscriminate grouping breeds disrespect for the law 
and the State agency, which will ultimately hinder enforce-
ment not only of recovery provisions, but of the underlying 
provisions for proper receipt of financial assistance. A 
previously innocent recipient could easily be converted into 
a welfare chisler. When one realizes that by coming forward 
with information indicating an overpayment he may precipitate 
his own prosecution and repayment obligation, he could very 
well feel compelled to remain silent. Then the error might 
never be corrected, and overpayments might continue indefiniU 
Until the blameless are encouraged to come forth with material 
information, rewarded rather than being punished equally with 
the blameworthy, public officials cannot assume to build 
respect for the law or the governmental agency charged with 
its enforcement. 
-11-
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A further policy reason for exercising power to decline 
collection carries greater weight than the State's interest in 
cutting costs - the need to permit recipients to become 
self-supporting. Collection robs those with only enough 
income to meet fixed living expenses of their only chance to 
achieve a standard of living that approximates minimum 
subsistence. Having relied on financial assistance later 
claimed as an overpayment, a household has spent that money 
on medical bills and other necessary living expenses, not 
incurred because of the receipt of the financial assistance. 
To then require repayment means that the household will 
incur further debts for living expenses. Therefore, a 
primary and overriding consideration relative to the public 
interest in exercising the power to decline collection is the 
balance of costs involved in attempting to collect from fault-
less households and the ~enefits derived from such attempts. 
The State will pursue an innocently overpaid household through 
legal proceedings at great expense in time, effort, other 
resources, and ultimately money to both parties, the courts, 
and ultimately the public, when the net result is but an unen-
forceable judgment against a household with little resources. 
Even if a repayment agreement can be structured to a household's 
marginal income, this too involves the expense of monitoring 
and enforcement. Furthermore, it :aay stretch the household's 
budget to a breaking point, 1eopardizing its ability to secure 
the basic necessities of life. 
Indeed collection punishes the wrong party, such that 
-12-
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principles of equity cqmpel the declination of collection. It 
must be remembered that the Appellant who has been overpaid 
due to innocent error never requested, either expressly or 
impliedly, financial assistance to which he was not entitled. 
He did not apply for finanical assistance to which he was not 
entitled nor even assent to, financial assistance to which 
he was not entitled when he received it, because he did not 
know he was not entitled to the assistance when he received 
it. Therefore the Defendant was not put on notice when he 
received the financial assistance that he would be obligated 
to repay it. 
Nor did the State expect to be repaid when it issued 
the financial assistance. When the household is without 
fault, the agency must accept responsiblity for an erroneous 
overpayment. Placing the obligation on recipients for over-
payments reduces the agency's motivation to correct or 
eliminate errors, since the agency knows it can require the 
recipients to repay. Accountability should be placed where 
fault lies, so that the problem can be arrested at its 
source. Stopgap measures will never be totally effective 
in eliminating mistakes. 
~Co summarize, those who are, currently subject to recovery 
or recoupment are perhaps the most faultless: those who 
have made an effort to become self-supporting, to have 
enough income other than public benefits from which the State 
can recover; and those who have been persuaded by moral 
compulsion to agree to repay from their current benefits. 
Then remain those from whom recovery is impossible. If the 
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agency were encou~aged to prevent errors, however, rather than 
discovering errors after the fact, then the State would not 
suffer the loss in these situations. Therefore the public 
interest requires that the Plaintiff decline collection from 
faultless households such as Appellant. 
POINT III 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL PRECLUDES 
THE STATE'S COLLECTION ACTION. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based upon public 
policy, fair dealing, good faith, and justice. 28 Am. Jur. 
2d Estoppel §28 (1966). Generally, the doctrine holds a 
person to a representation made or position assumed where 
otherwise inequitable consequences would result to another, who, 
having the right to do so, has in good faith relied on the 
representation or position and been misled to his injury. 
Traditionally, the doctrine has been involved in circum-
stances of fraud, been characterized as very harsh, and 
consequentlly not been favored. But recently the techni-
calities incident to estoppel have given way to practical 
utility, and the doctrine has been extended to unconscionable 
or inequitable situations, as a means of preventing injustice. 
The elements of equitable estoppel are set forth in 
Lucide v. Rippato, 73 Cal. App. 3d 1, 140 Cal. Rptr. 535, 
542 (1977), quoting from Strong v. County of Santa Cruz, 15 
Cal. 3d 720, 725, 543 P.2d 264 (1975). The facts of the 
present case satisfy those elements. 
(1) The party to be estopped must be apprised to the 
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facts. The State's Assistance Payments Administration 
was unaware of all relevant facts or could have been through 
reasonable diligence. ~~e Appellant supplied all information 
that the State requested of him. 
(2) The party to be estopped must act so that the party 
asserting estoppel has a right to believe the action was 
intended to be relied upon. 7he State's Assistance 
Payments Administration should reasonably have expected 
the Appellant to rely on its determination of his eligibility. 
(3) The party seeking estoppel must be ignorant of 
the facts. The Appellant acted conscientiously, in good 
faith, yet without any knowledge of administrative error. 
(4) The party seeking estoppel must rely on the action 
to his injury. The Appellant did rely on the State's determin 
of his eligibility and will be injured if forced to repay 
the overpayment. 
It has been held that an act done or representaion 
made through innocent error cannot be grounds for estoppel. 
28 Ain. Jur. 2d Estoppel §44 (1966). It could be contended 
that either the State's Assistance Payments Administra-
tion or Appellant conunitted an innocent error making equitable 
estoppel inappropriate. But general principles of equity hold 
that when one of two innocent parties must suffer a loss it 
must be borne by the one who has rendered the injury possible 
or who could have prevented it. 28 Arn. Jur. 2d Estoppel 
§62 (1966). The State determined the Appellant's eligibility 
for financial assistance so that the Appellant reasonably 
believed the determination was to be relied ~pon, see (2), 
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supra; thG Appellant did rely on the State's determination, by 
acquiring the financial assistance for which he was determined 
eligible, so that now he may suffer injury, see (4), supra. 
Moreover, the State should reasonably have expected 
the Appellant to rely on its determination of his eligibility, 
see (2}, supra, so that it could have prevented any resultant 
injury by making a correct determination. It can also be 
argued that the State was negligent and must take any 
consequences of its own acts, because Appellant is non-English 
speaking, yet the interview by the Assistance Payments 
Administration was conducted in English. 
The Restatement of Restitution §142 states in addition 
that if a right to recover payment made through error does 
exist, it may be defeated by a change of circumstances on the 
part of the recipient. As the New York Court of Appeals 
stated: 
Generally courts will look to see if a 
benefit has been conferred on the Defendant 
under mistake of fact or law, if the benefit 
still remains with the Defendant, if there 
has been otherwise a change of position by 
the Defendant and whether the Defendant's 
conduct was tortious or fradulent. 
Generally if a Plaintiff's recovery will lead 
to an undue net loss to the Defendant by 
reason of a changed position, as will often 
be the case when the funds have been disbursed, 
then the parties being equally innocent, 
recovery may be denied. 
Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. State, 30 N.Y. 2d 415, 
285 N.E. 2d 695, 699 (1972), cert. den., 414 U.S. 829 (1973). 
Here the financial assistance has been long since spent, and 
Appellant changed his position by spending the assistance. 
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Respondent is to blame for the overpayment, and it would be 
inequitable for it to take advantage of this situation. 
Comment(c) to Restatement §142 also supports this 
conclusion, by disallowing recovery where an erroneous payment 
has been spent for living expenses and "such payment was 
of such size that considering the financial condition of 
the payee it would be inequitable to require repayment." 
In the past, the use of equitable estoppel against the 
government was held inappropriate or at best was severely 
limited. However, the~ trend is to accept application of the 
doctrine against the government. Traditionally, whether the 
doctrine was usable was dependent upon whether governmental 
or proprietary functions were involved. Equitable estoppel 
was applicable against the state only when it acted in a 
proprietary capacity. However, the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that the governmental-proprietary dis~ 
tinction is difficult to apply and therefore rejected use of th 
governmental-proprietary distinction. Indian Towing Co. 
v. U.S., 350 U. S. 61 (1955); Dahelite v. U.S., 346 u. S. 15 
(1953). Even in jurisdictions that still maintain the 
governmental-proprietary distinction, the trend is away from 
denying use of equitable estoppel against government, even 
when it is performing a "governmental" function. The trend 
is toward applying the doctrine against public bodies where 
the interests of justice, equity, or common fairness dictate. 
Canfield v. Prof, 67 Cal. App.3d 722, 137 Cal. Rptr. 27 
(1977); Gruber v. Mayor and Township Committee of the 
Township of Raritan, 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d 489, 495 (1962). 
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The modern cases hold that equitable estoppel may be applied 
against the state acting in its governmental capacity. 
City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 448 
(1970}; Stahelin v. Board of Education, 87 Ill. App.2d 28, 
230 N.W.2d 465 (1967). 
The only precondition to applying the doctrine against 
a state acting in a 11 governmental" capacity is that 
the estoppel not impair governmental functions or proper 
discharge of governmental duties. Ford v. Bellingham-
Whatcum County Distric~ Board of Health, 83 Wash.2d 618, 
521 P.2d 736 (1974). Application of equitable estoppel 
against Plaintiff-Respondent does not impair it in discharging 
its duties. Recovery in this case would defeat equity 
and good conscience and thus result in manifest injustice. 
POINT IV 
AN INTERVIEW IN ENGLISH WHICH DETERMINED APPELLANT'S 
ELIGIBILITY FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BY AN ASSISTANCE 
PAYMENTS ADMINISTRATION REPRESENTATIVE WHO SPOKE ONLY 
ENGLISH AND WHO KNEW APPELLANT WAS LITERATE ONLY IN 
SPANISH, WAS A VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION AFFORDED 
BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The protection afforded under the equal protection 
guarantees was set forth by the Hawaii Supreme Court in 
State v. Cotton, 516 P. 2d 715, 717 (1973). In examining 
the constitutionality of an ordinance requiring a motorcycle 
operator to wear head protection equipment the court held: 
The general principle stated by the courts in the 
interpretation of the equal protection clause is 
that all persons shall be treated alike under like 
circumstances and conditions, both in privileges 
conferred and in liabilities imposed. 
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The California Supreme Court in Hawkins v. Superior 
Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 586 P.2d 
916, · 921 (1978), confronted the equal protection issue where ti 
defendant was denied a postindictment preliminary hearing. 
The court acknowledged the classical test for examining 
whether the State has violated the equal protection clause. 
The court stated: 
Under the traditional two-tier test of equal 
protection a discriminatory legislative classificati 
that impairs fundamental rights will be subjected 
to strict sqrutiny by the courts, and the state 
will be required to bear the heavy burden of pro-
viding not only that it has a compelling interest 
which justifies classification but also that 
discrimination is necessary to promote that interest 
Since the equal protection clause is applicable only to 
State action, to establish a violation thereof, it is 
necessary to show: 
(1) State action; 
(2) discriminatory classification; 
(3) impairment of fundamental rights; and 
(4) no compelling State interest. 
In the present case State action is manifest in the 
promulgation of Volume II of the Assistance Payments 
Administration regulations for the State of Utah. It is 
Volume II that does not require the· Assistance Payments 
Administration to conduct interviews in Spanish for non-
English speaking individuals to determine if they qualify 
for financial assistance. Since State action is involved 
the first element to establish a violation of equal 
protection is satisfied. 
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The essence of aDy discriminatory classification finds 
substance in its discriminatory effect. A· law may appear to 
be nondiscriminatory on its face; however, it is the discriminator 
impact of that law upon a protected minority that renders it 
illegal. In r.:e Ia..Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 52 (9th 
Cir. 1978), a case involving the alleged denial of equal 
educational opportunities, the Court of Appeals held: 
Discriminatory effect and its paraphrases simply 
serve to capture the sense of differential, dis-
parate, or disproportionate consequences which 
facially nondiscriminatory laws, decision, or other 
actions may have upon a member of a particular 
protected minority and as such they operate only 
to signal the beginning of the equal protection 
analysis .... 
Volume II of the Assistance Payment Administration 
appears nondiscriminatory on its face. When any individual 
goes into an Assistance P~yment Administration Office to 
apply for assistance, he is interviewed by an English 
speaking representative. It is the "discriminatory effect" 
that an interview in English has upon the Spanish speaking 
recipient whose literacy in English is limited that creates 
the constitutional violation. In order that he might under-
stand the contents of the interview the Spanish speaking 
recipient is burdened with seeking out a translator. The 
recipient may be unable to obtain a translator. If he does 
not find one he £aces the risk of not being given aid or in 
the alternative being given aid outside the regulations. 
In any event the risk is great that because of the interview 
being in English the Spanish speaking recipient may be denied 
financial assistance without ever being able to communicate 
-20-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
essential information to the Assistance Payments Administration 
representative or in the alternative be given benefits 
only to have an overpayment collection proceeding against 
him later. 
The discriminatory effect is therefore that the Spanish 
speaking recipient is shouldered with the burden and expense 
of seeking out a translator. The English speaking recipient 
is of course not faced with this problem. If the Spanish 
speaking recipient is unable to obtain a translator he 
would probably be denied benefits or in the alternative be 
granted benefits only to face legal action to collect those 
benefits back at a later time. The risk is substantial that 
the recipient will suffer overpayment proceedings or denial 
of aid. The English speaking recipient is not faced with 
these risks in receiving financial assistance. Having, 
therefore, established the discriminatory effect of Volume 
II of the Assistance Payments Administration regulation, the 
second element necessary to show a violation of equal protectim 
has been met. 
Absent a suspect classification, discriminatory State 
action must impair a fundamental right to constitute a 
violation of equal protection. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 
supra. It is clear that when a person is denied financial 
assistance, either outright or through subsequent overpayment 
collection ~roceedings, without an opportunity to present 
the facts, fundamental due process rights have been impaired. 
The critic al importance of financial assistance to a ·.)erson 
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unemployed and injured and without any alternative source of 
income is self-evident. "Since he lacks independent resources 
his situation becomes immediately desperate" Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Until the recipient is able 
build up his health and secure new employment, the general 
welfare-food, clothing, ~ousing, medical care, transportation, 
for him and his family - is dependent upon the receipt of 
financial assistance. 
Discriminatory State action denying the oppo~tunity to 
present one's case for financial assistance not only 
impairs the right to exist, as secured through retention of 
financial assistance benefits, but violates the most 
fundamental right to due process. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra. 
Since due process is a fundamental right, the element of 
State impairment of a fundamental right is satisfied. 
Even though it has been established that Volume II 
of the Assistance Payments Administration is State action, 
discrimatory in nature, and impairing a fundamental right, 
this regulation may not be violative of the equal protection 
clause if it is justified by a compelling State interest. 
Hawkins, supra. The 9rimary State interest in this case 
would be the cost of hiring Spanish speaking individuals to 
conduct interviews with Spanish speaking individuals. 
The State has a legitimate concern in preventing any 
increase in its administrative budgets. However, the number 
of persons actually entitled to interviews in Spanish would 
be comparatively few. The cost to the State would therefore 
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be minimal -- a liberal approximation would estimate the total 
number of Mexican-Americans in the State of Utah at 60,000 or 
6% of the total State population. Interviews in Spanish wouldi 
only be required for those persons identified in their 
interview with an Assistance Payments Ad!f!_~nistration repre-
sentative as being literate only in Spanish. The number of 
Mexican-Americans falling into that category would be minimal. 
In Goldberg, supra, the competing interests were quite 
similar to the present case, i.e., cost to the state and 
importance to the indfvidual in receiving public assistance. 
The cost to the state in Goldberg was the expense in providing 
the recipient a hearing. That adminstrative cost Has vastly 
greater than the cost to the State of Utah in Jiring Spanish 
speaking individuals when required. The United States 
Supreme Court in Goldberg held: 
The interest of the eligible recipient in the unin-
terpreted receipt of public assistance uhich pro-
vides him with essential food, clothing, housing 
and medical care, coupled with the State's interest 
that his payment not be erroneously terminated, 
clearly outweighs the State's competing concern 
to prevent any increase in its fiscal and admin-
istrative budgets. 
Id. at 264-66. The interest of the State in preventing any 
increase in its budget does not rise to the level of a 
compelling interest. There are a multitude of ways that a 
cost-conscious State agency can maintain a lean budget. In 
the present case the competing interest of the Spanish 
speaking recipient and all other persons similarly situated 
is too great a price to pay for one means of cost conservation. 
All the essential elements have therefore been met to constitut 
a violation of equal protection. 
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CONCLUSION 
~his Brief assumes all of the facts that would be 
necessary to support Respondent's position and shows that 
even based on those facts ~espondent is entitled to no 
relief. 
The Appellant during the time in question "occupied" 
his home in Muleshoe, Texas, and was therefore eligible for 
financial assistance because his home Has exempt under 
Volume II Section 410.1 of the Utah Rules. 
The interview in English which was conducted by the 
Respondent with the Appellant, who is non-English speaking, 
was a violation of the Utah and the United States Constituions. 
Furthermore, the Respondent is estopped from collecting any 
overpayments to· Appellant, if in fact there v1ere any. 
More compelling is an analysis of the competing State 
I 
and private interests. The number of Spanish speaking recipientsi 
justifying interviews in the Spanish language would be 
relatively minimal. The small percentage of Mexican-Americans 
living within the State of Utah coupled with small percentage 
of Mexican-Americans requiring interviews in Spanish uecause 
of their limited literacy in English along with the low 
welfare r~te less than 3% justifies th~se conslusions. ~on-
sequently the cost to the State would be comparatively low. 
In contrast the nature of the interest to the recipient 
is critical. AFDC benefits may likely be the recipient's 
sole source of income and support for him and his family. A 
balancing of the interests weighs heavily in favor of the 
recipient. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra. 
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~he Appellant having been erroneously subjected to a 
collection proceeding, improperly denied adequate notice and 
an opportunity to present the facts properly to t~e Respondent 
in the interview, brings us to the conclusion that Appellant 
should not be the subject of collection proceedings any 
longer. 
1980. 
Respectfully submitted this Jilgd.ay of ,...~ 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorney for Appellant 
~~,~.C~-By: -7\NTHOI. AYIJA 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief to Stephen G. Schwendiman, Assistant 
Attorney General, 150 West North ~emple, Suite 234, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84103. 
DATED this 3& day o~ dA ~ < I 1980. 
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